A Knock on Knick\u27s Revival of Federal Takings Litigation by Sterk, Stewart E. & Pollack, Michael C.
Florida Law Review 
Volume 72 Issue 2 Article 6 
A Knock on Knick's Revival of Federal Takings Litigation 
Stewart E. Sterk 
Michael C. Pollack 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stewart E. Sterk and Michael C. Pollack, A Knock on Knick's Revival of Federal Takings Litigation, 72 Fla. 
L. Rev. 419 (). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu. 
419 
A KNOCK ON KNICK’S REVIVAL OF FEDERAL TAKINGS 
LITIGATION 
Stewart E. Sterk* & Michael C. Pollack** 
Abstract 
 
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the United States Supreme Court held 
that a landowner who claimed to have suffered a taking at the hands of 
state or local officials could seek redress in federal court without the need 
to first seek compensation through state proceedings. This holding raises 
serious theoretical and practical concerns.  On the theoretical side, Knick 
rests on the implicit assumption that states separate powers among 
branches of government in the same way the federal government does. It 
also relies on a second assumption: that relegating taking claims to state 
court makes them unique. Neither is true. 
Beyond the opinion’s shaky theoretical foundation, Knick will require 
federal courts to determine precisely when an alleged “taking” is in fact 
complete and final—an issue they have heretofore been spared. 
Moreover, nothing in the Court’s opinion limits its scope to regulatory 
takings. The opinion simply does not deal with the host of ways in which 
state and local government can interfere with private property rights. 
These include taking actions on adjacent property that have adverse 
impacts on a landowner’s parcel (like sewage backups or flooding) and 
explicitly exercising the eminent domain power. Unless the Court 
narrows its opinion, the Court’s conceptual separation of takings from 
just compensation threatens to open the doors of federal courts to a 
variety of claims that the Court does not appear to have anticipated and 
that federal courts are ill-equipped to address—including but not limited 
to claims for valuation of property taken through exercise of the eminent 
domain power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a landowner contends that government action has effected a 
taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,1 where can she sue? Until the 
United States Supreme Court decided Knick v. Township of Scott2 in June 
2019,3 the answer was clear: State court and only state court. This was so 
because the Court held over thirty years ago in Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank4 that a takings claim 
brought in federal court was unripe until after the aggrieved landowner 
had used state procedures to seek compensation.5 More recently, in San 
Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco,6 the Court applied preclusion 
principles to deny a federal forum to a plaintiff who came to federal court 
after having unsuccessfully pursued a takings claim in state court.7 The 
result: federal redress was available to a landowner only if the United 
States Supreme Court was to entertain review of a final state court 
determination.8 
No longer. Concerned that its case law had transformed the 
Constitution’s takings protection into a uniquely second-class 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 2. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 3. Id. at 2167. 
 4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162. 
 5. Id. at 195. 
 6. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).  
 7. Id. at 347. 
 8. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 251, 283, 300–01 (2006).  
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constitutional right,9 the Court in Knick overruled Williamson County and 
held that a landowner who claimed to have suffered a taking at the hands 
of state or local officials could seek redress in federal court without the 
need to first seek compensation through state proceedings.10 The Court 
accomplished this result by separating the state’s alleged “taking” of 
property from its denial of “just compensation.”11 The Court held that the 
federal claim ripened when the alleged taking was complete, without 
regard to whether the state had in place a procedure for providing just 
compensation.12 
While many have cheered this result,13 the Court’s reasoning and its 
conclusion both raise serious problems—and those problems go beyond 
those identified by the dissenting justices. First, Knick rests on a 
questionable theoretical foundation, for it effectively assumes that states 
separate powers among branches of government in the same way the 
federal government does. But there is no federal constitutional 
requirement that they do so, and the states generally do not. The Court’s 
concern that relegating taking claims to state court makes them unique is 
also questionable, to say the least. Quite the contrary, the Court’s 
preclusion doctrine limits access to federal courts for plaintiffs who 
contend that state or local officials have violated numerous other 
constitutional rights, including the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, beyond the opinion’s shaky theoretical foundation, Knick 
raises a whole host of unaddressed and apparently unnoticed practical 
questions. The Court’s opinion will require federal courts to determine 
precisely when an alleged “taking” is in fact complete and final—an issue 
they have heretofore been spared given Williamson County’s 
compensation-seeking requirement. Moreover, the Court’s opinions do 
not account for the many ways in which taking claims can arise—a 
product of the host of ways in which state and local government can 
interfere with private property rights. These include regulating property 
through the zoning process, making pronouncements that reduce the 
 
 9. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169 (“The state-litigation requirement relegates the Takings Clause 
‘to the status of a poor relation’ among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.” (quoting Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994))). 
 10. Id. at 2168. 
 11. Id. at 2170. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, A Small Step Forward in Knick, ORIGINALISM BLOG 
(June 22, 2019), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2019/06/a-small-step-
forward-in-knickmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/9M8P-QSZJ]; Ilya Somin, Supreme 
Court Overrules Precedent that Created “Catch-22” for Property Owners Attempting to Bring 
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value of property like announcing a future condemnation,14 taking actions 
on adjacent property that have adverse impacts on a landowner’s parcel 
like sewage backups or flooding,15 explicitly exercising the eminent 
domain power,16 and more. Knick dealt with regulation, but the Court’s 
conceptual separation of takings from just compensation might open the 
doors of federal courts to a variety of other sorts of taking claims that the 
Court does not appear to have anticipated. In particular, federal courts 
might even have jurisdiction over claims by condemnees seeking to avoid 
state substantive rules and procedures for valuing property taken for 
public use. 
This Article critiques Knick along both these theoretical and practical 
lines. This Article does not predict how courts will ultimately resolve the 
practical issues. It will not be long, however, before the Court will be 
faced with the need to clean up the mess it made. 
I.  KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT AND ITS PREDECESSORS 
 
 An understanding of Knick and its flaws requires an examination of 
two earlier cases that channeled takings litigation into the state courts.  
This Part examines those two cases before turning to the Knick opinions. 
A.  Williamson County and San Remo 
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee 
developer’s taking claim in federal district court was unripe for two 
reasons: First, the developer had not obtained a final decision on its 
application for a new residential subdivision.17 Second, the developer had 
not used the relevant state procedures for obtaining just compensation.18 
In defending the second ripeness requirement, the Court emphasized that 
“[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it 
proscribes taking without just compensation.”19 As a result, the Court 
concluded that so long as the state provides a procedure for a landowner 
to obtain just compensation, the landowner cannot proceed to federal 
court until she has used that procedure and been denied compensation.20 
This resolution was somewhat unexpected. When the Supreme Court 
first granted certiorari in Williamson County, the assumption was that it 
would resolve a then-unresolved question: Are damages available as a 
 
 14. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 116 (Minn. 2003). 
 15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 928 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ohio 2010). 
 16. See. e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 520 (2005). 
 17. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186–94 
(1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162. 
 18. Id. at 194–97. 
 19. Id. at 194. 
 20. Id. at 194–95. 
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remedy for unconstitutional land use regulation, or is the affected 
landowner limited to injunctive relief?21 The plaintiff developer in that 
case had obtained preliminary subdivision approval and spent $3.5 
million on a golf course and sewer facilities, only to see the county amend 
its zoning ordinance to reduce permissible density in that area.22 County 
agencies disagreed about what to do next: The Planning Commission 
concluded that the new ordinance should apply to the developer’s 
subdivision, and though the Board of Zoning Appeals disagreed, the 
Planning Commission concluded that the Board of Zoning Appeals could 
not overrule it.23 Hamilton Bank, which had obtained title to the parcel 
through foreclosure, then sued in federal court, alleging a taking.24 A jury 
agreed and awarded $350,000 in damages.25 But the trial court, while 
issuing an injunction, entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the damages claim, concluding that temporary deprivations could not 
constitute a taking as a matter of law.26 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed and held that damages were available.27 
The Court punted the damages question by concluding that the claim 
was unripe, but the Court’s ripeness holding was more than a convenient 
ruse for avoiding a controversial issue. The Court could have 
accomplished that objective by focusing on finality alone—without 
articulating the requirement that a taking plaintiff use state procedures—
because of the disagreement between county agencies, and because the 
developer still had administrative options available like seeking a 
variance from either the Board of Zoning Appeals (which had the power 
to vary the density limits in the zoning ordinance) or from the Planning 
Commission (which had power to depart from several subdivision 
regulations). But the Court went further and held that the landowner had 
not used available state procedures to seek compensation, emphasizing 
that Tennessee state courts allow recovery through “inverse 
condemnation” suits when restrictive development regulations effect a 
taking.28 
The Williamson County opinion appeared to contemplate that a 
landowner could ripen a federal court takings claim by seeking all relief 
available under state law. But the Court’s subsequent opinion in San 
Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco made it clear that a landowner 
 
 21. That was the question on which the court granted certiorari. See id. at 185. 
 22. Id. at 178. 
 23. Id. at 179–82. 
 24. Id. at 182. 
 25. Id. at 183. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 729 F.2d 402, 409 (6th 
Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019). 
 28. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 196. 
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who raised the takings claim in state court would instead be precluded 
from subsequently raising the same claim in federal court by operation of 
the federal Full Faith and Credit Statute.29 The Court held that a 
landowner who had raised a state constitutional takings claim in state 
court could not subsequently raise a federal takings claim in federal court 
because the issues underlying the two claims were identical.30 Its 
reasoning appeared to rely on issue preclusion doctrine,31 but because the 
takings plaintiff could have also raised its federal takings claim in that 
state court proceeding, claim preclusion doctrine would have precluded 
it from subsequently raising that federal claim in federal court too, even 
if the plaintiff chose not to raise it in the state proceeding.32 In effect, 
then, Williamson County and San Remo together operated to channel all 
takings claims (other than those against the federal government) into state 
court. 
B.  The Knick Opinions 
Williamson County and San Remo generated concern from those who 
contended that, by limiting takings plaintiffs’ access to federal courts, the 
Court had relegated takings protection into the status of a second-class 
constitutional right.33 In Knick, the landowner, represented by the Pacific 
 
 29. San Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347–48 (2005); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012) (explaining how full faith and credit applies). 
 30. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 347. 
 31. The Court observed that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had relied on issue preclusion principles to 
hold landowner’s claim barred. Id. at 334–35. In affirming, the Court emphasized that the 
landowner had advanced in state court the same constitutional issues it later asked the federal 
courts to resolve. Id. at 341. The Court’s opinion states that “we are presently concerned only with 
issues actually decided by the state court that are dispositive of federal claims raised under 
§ 1983.” Id. at 343. The focus on issues actually decided suggests that the Court, like the courts 
below, had issue preclusion doctrine in mind. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 
(AM. LAW INST. 1982) (noting that issue preclusion applies to issues “actually litigated and 
determined by a valid and final judgment”). 
 32. See Sterk, supra note 8, at 281–82. 
 33. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The Expansion of Williamson County’s 
Baseless “State Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB. 
LAW. 615, 650 (2009) (lamenting exclusion of individual rights in property from the class of civil 
rights protected by § 1983); J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave: 
The Story of San Remo Hotel––The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State 
Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 247, 281 (2006) (arguing that San Remo “has singled out property owners as second-class 
constitutional claimants”); Gideon Kanner, “[Un]Equal Justice Under Law”: The Invidiously 
Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 
1073 (2007) (characterizing property owners complaining of takings as “legal pariahs who, unlike 
other constitutionally aggrieved plaintiffs, are barred from seeking their federal constitutional 
remedy from the federal courts”). 
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Legal Foundation, urged the Court to overrule Williamson County. By a 
vote of 5–4, the Court did just that.34 
1.  The Facts 
Rose Knick’s ninety-acre Pennsylvania parcel included a small family 
cemetery.35 In 2012, the Township of Scott enacted an ordinance 
requiring that cemeteries be open to the public during the day.36 When 
town officials discovered the cemetery on Ms. Knick’s parcel the 
following year, they informed her that she was violating the ordinance.37 
Ms. Knick then proceeded to state court, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief on the ground that the ordinance worked a taking of her 
property.38 She did not seek compensation. The town responded by 
withdrawing the violation notice and agreeing to stay enforcement 
pending resolution of the state court proceeding.39 The state court, 
however, declined to rule on Ms. Knick’s request for declaratory and 
injunctive relief because, in the absence of enforcement by the town, she 
could not show the irreparable harm necessary for obtaining injunctive 
relief.40 
Ms. Knick then sued in federal district court, alleging that the 
ordinance constituted a taking.41 The district court dismissed her claim as 
unripe,42 citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,43 and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.44 
  
 
 34. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019). 
 35. Id. at 2168. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2169. 
 43. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 200 (1985), 
overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162. 
 44. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019).  
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2.  The Majority Opinion 
Writing for five Justices, Chief Justice John Roberts started by 
opining that “[t]he San Remo preclusion trap should tip us off that the 
state-litigation requirement [in Williamson County] rests on a mistaken 
view of the Fifth Amendment.”45 In the Court’s view, the requirement 
was inconsistent with the supposed “guarantee” provided by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 (commonly referred to as “Section 1983”) of a federal 
forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state 
officials.46 
While noting that Williamson County’s finality requirement “is not at 
issue here,”47 the majority concluded that “[t]he state-litigation 
requirement relegates the Takings Clause ‘to the status of a poor relation’ 
among the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”48 By overruling that 
requirement, the Court claimed to be “restoring takings claims to the full-
fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned.”49 
Analytically, the Court rejected the contention underlying the 
Williamson County state-litigation requirement that no constitutional 
violation occurs until the state actually denies compensation.50  Instead, 
the Court held, “If a local government takes private property without 
paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just as 
the Takings Clause says—without regard to subsequent state court 
proceedings.”51 As a result, an aggrieved landowner can bring the takings 
claim in federal court at the moment of the alleged taking, regardless of 
any post-taking remedies the state might make available.52 
The Chief Justice then turned to whether stare decisis counseled in 
favor of retaining Williamson County, however incorrect its reasoning.53 
Because the Williamson County analysis was “exceptionally ill founded” 
and because the state-litigation requirement had generated no reliance 




 45. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 46. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 47. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169. 
 48. Id. (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994)). 
 49. Id. at 2170. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2177–79.  
 54. Id.  
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3.  The Dissent 
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for four dissenting Justices, rejected the 
majority’s effort to analogize the Takings Clause to other constitutional 
protections. She argued that “[t]he distinctive aspects of litigating a 
takings claim merely reflect the distinctive aspects of the constitutional 
right.”55 As an example, she noted that a Fourth Amendment claim arises 
when “a police officer uses excessive force, because the Constitution 
prohibits that thing and that thing only,” while a takings claim arises 
“only [when] two things occur: (1) the government takes property, and 
(2) it fails to pay just compensation.”56 
The dissent also contended that overruling Williamson County would 
have two damaging consequences: it will “turn . . . well-meaning 
government officials into lawbreakers[, a]nd it will subvert important 
principles of judicial federalism.”57 In support of the federalism point, 
Justice Kagan emphasized that—unlike other constitutional claims—
takings claims require a court to decide “whether, under state law, the 
plaintiff has a property interest in the thing regulated.”58 The state law 
questions that underlie taking claims, she noted, are not familiar to federal 
courts,59 and she lamented that the Court’s decision will “send[] a flood 
of complex state-law issues to federal courts”60 and “make[] federal 
courts a principal player in local and state land-use disputes.”61 
Justice Kagan offered several examples of state law issues that federal 
courts will now have to resolve—starting with the background cemetery 
law in Pennsylvania necessary to resolve the question in Knick itself.62 
She also noted differences in the scope of state public trust doctrine, 
differences which might affect the validity of state regulation of 
beachfront land.63 
Finally, Justice Kagan lamented the short shrift the Court’s opinion 
gave to stare decisis, especially because Congress had the power to 
eliminate the so-called “preclusion trap” by amending the federal law that 
requires federal courts to afford preclusive effect to these sorts of state 
court judgments.64 
 
 55. Id. at 2184 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 2187.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 2188. 
 60. Id. at 2188–89.  
 61. Id. at 2189. 
 62. Id. at 2187–88. 
 63. Id. at 2188. 
 64. Id. at 2189. For a defense of the Court’s decision on stare decisis grounds, see Ilya 
Somin & Shelley Ross Saxer, Overturning a Catch-22 in the Knick of Time: Knick v. Township 
of Scott and the Doctrine of Precedent, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3523194 [https://perma.cc/E296-UWDW]. 
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II.  THEORETICAL ISSUES 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Court’s opinion in 
Knick turns on two theoretical premises: first, that whether the 
government’s supposed taking is unconstitutional is conceptually 
separate from whether the government has provided just compensation, 
and second, that a federal forum must be available for constitutional 
violations by state or local officials. Both of those premises are at least 
contestable, if not just wrong. 
A.  Separating “Taking” from “Just Compensation” 
The Court’s primary argument relies on the idea that the government 
taking of property is conceptually complete prior to the ultimate 
determination by the state that compensation is not owed (or that 
compensation will not be rendered in what the plaintiff owner believes is 
a sufficient amount).65  So when the Court said that “a property owner has 
a claim for a violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government 
takes his property for public use without paying for it,”66 it meant that a 
property owner has a claim so long as the state or municipality does not 
provide “immediate[]” compensation.67 The subsequent determination by 
a state court that compensation is owed has nothing to do with whether 
the Takings Clause was violated, according to the Court; instead, it 
speaks to whether the state has remedied a violation that already took 
place.68 
As Justice Kagan explained in her dissent, this is a novel 
characterization of the Takings Clause that departs from over a century 
of precedent.69 But the Court’s error is not simply a doctrinal one. This 
conceptual severance between the alleged taking of property, on the one 
hand, and the determination of whether compensation is owed for that 
taking, on the other, assumes a separation of powers and functions at the 
state level that is not compelled by the U.S. Constitution—and that, in 
fact, does not strictly exist. The Court never explicitly articulates its 
notion of state government processes, but from its viewpoint, an alleged 
taking is complete and ready to be litigated on the merits as soon as some 
entity of state or local government takes an action or imposes a 
 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 50–52. 
 66. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170. 
 67. See id. at 2172 (emphasis added) (discussing First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 318 (1987)). 
 68. Id. (“A later payment of compensation may remedy the constitutional violation that 
occurred at the time of the taking, but that does not mean the violation never took place.”). 
 69. Id. at 2182–83, 2185–87 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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regulation.70 That entity might be a city council or a town board,71 or it 
might be a statewide entity like the South Carolina Coastal Council.72 
Either way, in the Court’s view, once that entity takes action and fails to 
pay compensation immediately, any Takings Clause violation is 
complete. All that remains is determining the remedy available to the 
property owner. For that, the property owner can turn away from the city 
council or statewide agency and proceed directly to federal court. 
If state and local governments were required to maintain a strict 
separation of powers, or if they did in fact maintain such a strict 
separation, the Court would have been on somewhat more stable 
theoretical footing, at least as concerns this aspect of its decision. But 
neither is true. The U.S. Constitution says next to nothing about how 
states are to structure their governments beyond the thin requirement that 
states have a “Republican Form of Government.”73 As the Court has 
previously observed,  
Whether the legislative, executive and judicial powers of a 
State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or 
whether persons . . . belonging to one department may, in 
respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly 
speaking, pertain to another department of government, is 
for the determination of the State.74  
And the states have in turn taken a “varied, pragmatic approach in 
establishing government[]” that often scrambles the more rigid separation 
of powers that exists at the federal level—and that the Knick Court seems 
to have had in mind.75 
One result of this blurry separation of powers at the state level that is 
particularly relevant here has to do with state courts. As one of us has 
explored in depth, state law throughout the country charges the state 
courts with handling a wide array of functions beyond resolving disputes 
and remedying violations of law alleged to have occurred in the past.76 
 
 70. See Robert H. Thomas, Sublimating Home Rule and Separation of Powers in Knick v. 
Township of Scott, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 27), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3490905 [https://perma.cc/8W3L-QKD5] 
(similarly observing, though without disagreement, that the Court “assumed that when a 
municipal government is doing the taking, state law making a state court inverse condemnation 
lawsuit available was not ‘the [same] government’ doing the compensating”). 
 71. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110–11 (1978). 
 72. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1007–08 (1992). 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 74. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). 
 75. Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 482–83 (1968) (quoting ROBERT C. WOOD, 
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 891–92 (1965)). 
 76. See Michael C. Pollack, The State Courts Beyond Judging (Feb. 12, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Indeed, some of the roles state courts routinely play are fairly 
characterized as quasi-administrative in that they entail making initial 
determinations about a person’s entitlement to legal benefits like a formal 
name change, a license to practice law, or an abortion without parental 
notification or consent.77 Some state court roles are also fairly 
characterized as quasi-legislative in that they entail setting policy outside 
the context of dispute resolution. Determining the boundaries of 
legislative districts and creating new specialty criminal courts like drug 
treatment courts and veterans courts are just two examples.78 And while 
there are normative reasons to question or reform some of those 
allocations,79 there is no legal limitation preventing a state from choosing 
to make its courts an integral component of all sorts of regulatory 
schemes. This includes land use regulation—both its more legislative 
aspects like zoning and its more administrative aspects like granting or 
denying variances or other permits.80 
Indeed, some states have done just that. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, for example, has intermittently required judicial approval of all 
local zoning ordinances to make sure each municipality provides its “fair 
share” of the area’s affordable housing needs.81 If a New Jersey 
municipality enacted a zoning ordinance that a property owner believed 
effected a taking, would the Knick Court think the taking complete when 
the municipality enacted the ordinance? Or when the appropriate New 
Jersey state court approved it? Adhering to the Knick Court’s cramped 
conception of what state legislatures and state courts respectively do 
might lead one to conclude the taking was complete upon municipal 
enactment. But that would be incoherent because the ordinance would not 
 
 77. See id. at 8–22. 
 78. See id. at 26–33. 
 79. See id. at 37–63. 
 80. It is therefore not necessarily the case, as a matter of any constitutional principle, that 
state courts are “not acting as an arm of local government” in the takings setting. Thomas, supra 
note 70, at 24. Far from being “outmoded,” id., the idea that local governments and state courts 
are all instrumentalities of the same state government remains at the foundation of local 
government law. See, e.g., Avery, 390 U.S. at 480 (“The actions of local government are the 
actions of the State.”); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) (“Municipal corporations 
are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the 
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.”). Even localities with the power 
to act independently of the state legislature only have that power because state law—either 
constitutional or statutory—affords them it. See, e.g., LYNN A. BAKER, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & 
DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 247 (5th ed. 2015) (“[T]here is nothing either 
inevitable or immutable about the relationship between the states and their political 
subdivisions….[E]ven those jurisdictions that nominally grant a significant scope of ‘home rule’ 
authority to their localities may ultimately define the areas of autonomy so narrowly as to permit 
[state] legislative control of local activity in most areas of substantive importance.”). 
 81. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 438–41 
(N.J. 1983). 
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actually be effective until the court approves it. At the same time, if the 
action did not ripen until court approval, then a citizen’s right to bring her 
claim in federal court under Knick would turn entirely on how the state 
happened to structure its regulatory system and distribute its regulatory 
power: In states like New Jersey, takings plaintiffs would have to run at 
least some of their claim through state court before accessing a federal 
forum, while in states without this sort of rule, takings plaintiffs could 
access a federal forum as soon as the municipality made its decision. 
There is no principled basis under the U.S. Constitution for that 
distinction, but by overlooking the multiplicity of state and local 
government forms, Knick’s logic demands it. By contrast, under 
Williamson County, that sort of distinction made no difference at all, and 
takings plaintiffs were treated the same across the states in terms of when 
they could access federal court. 
The problem comes into bolder relief if we think about a state that 
goes further and confers on its courts of general jurisdiction the power to 
decide in the first instance and all at once whether particular land use 
restrictions should proceed with compensation, without compensation, or 
not at all. While these sorts of decisions are more typically reserved to 
local legislative or administrative bodies, the foregoing discussion 
illustrated that state courts are in fact charged with a number of tasks more 
typically assigned to legislative or administrative bodies. Suppose, then, 
that a state delegated to its courts precisely this decision-making 
authority. No property owner could access a federal forum for his federal 
takings claim until the state court had made its decision. This state would 
therefore have essentially returned its property owners to the Williamson 
County regime simply by structuring its decision-making authority in a 
particular way. The Knick Court’s reasoning not only fails to account for 
this possibility, but affirmatively enables it by leaving the trigger for 
access to federal court up to the happenstance of how any given state 
structures its land use decision-making process. 
Given the flexibility of state separation of powers, there is little limit 
to these hypotheticals (and next to none as a matter of federal law). States 
could therefore allocate regulatory authority in ways that give state courts 
greater or lesser roles at earlier or later stages of the zoning and land use 
process. The result under Knick is that plaintiffs’ abilities to access 
federal court in vindication of a federal constitutional right will depend 
on how states happen to make this choice. The Court appears to have 
assumed that state and local regulatory authority would consistently 
belong on the front end to some recognizably “legislative” or 
“administrative” body, and that compensation would come on the back 
end from some recognizably “judicial” body like a state court. But 
because none of that is necessarily true, the Court’s holding treats 
plaintiffs differently depending on the structure of their state government. 
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Worse, the fact that so much now turns on aspects of state law that have 
no relevance to when a plaintiff ought to be able to press her takings claim 
in federal court suggests that it is indeed quite difficult to conceptually 
and consistently separate the alleged taking from the provision of 
compensation. 
B.  Availability of Federal Relief: The “Preclusion Trap” 
The balance of the Court’s opinion rests on the supposed “preclusion 
trap.” The so-called “trap” is that Williamson County’s second ripeness 
prong—requiring property owners to fully litigate their claims for 
compensation in state court before turning to federal court—does not 
merely postpone federal review. Rather, it prevents review altogether 
when joined with the conclusion in San Remo that takings plaintiffs are 
precluded by the federal Full Faith and Credit Statute from relitigating 
the issues actually litigated in their state court takings cases in federal 
district court.82 The result, according to the Knick Court, is an intolerable 
“Catch-22”: A takings plaintiff “cannot go to federal court without going 
to state court first [under Williamson County]; but if he goes to state court 
and loses, his claim will be barred in federal court” under San Remo.83 
Meanwhile, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is said to “provide access to a 
federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of 
state officials.”84 The Williamson County–San Remo obstacle to that 
federal forum certainly existed, certainly sounds unfair, and certainly 
makes for powerful rhetoric.85 Perhaps that is why the Knick opinion 
features the “preclusion trap” phrase three times.86 
But the rhetoric belies a few deeper problems with the argument. The 
first is one that Justice Kagan gestured to in her dissent in Knick.87 As she 
explained, San Remo interpreted a federal statute.88 If there is any 
inconsistency between that statute and the Civil Rights Act, it is one that 
Congress created, and one that Congress could fix. Justice Kagan’s point 
was primarily one about stare decisis; that is, because Congress “can 
reverse the San Remo preclusion rule any time it wants,” the Court ought 
to adhere to its prior precedents.89 Justice Kagan is certainly right that 
Congress could have overturned San Remo, and she was also right to 
 
 82. San Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 335–39, 342 (2005).  
 83. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019); see Somin & Saxer, supra 
note 64, at 10. 
 84. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). 
 85. See Sterk, supra note 8, at 276–77 (acknowledging that “claim preclusion, combined 
with the Williamson County ripeness requirements, provides a nearly insurmountable obstacle for 
claimants seeking federal court litigation of federal takings claims”). 
 86. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167, 2174, 2179. 
 87. Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. 
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continue sounding the alarm bells about the majority’s treatment of 
precedent throughout the Term.90 
But the point that the preclusion “trap” is set by a federal statute (and 
by San Remo) goes to the substance of the Court’s position as well, in 
two ways. First, if the Court had a problem with the preclusive effect of 
state court takings judgments and was unwilling to wait for Congress to 
fix it, then the Court should have trained its focus on the case which 
confirmed that preclusive effect: San Remo. Williamson County merely 
held that takings claims are not fully ripe until the plaintiff has been 
finally denied compensation through a state’s processes.91 Nothing about 
that holding entraps anyone. And in light of the variety of institutional 
forms for state takings processes discussed above, as well as the practical 
considerations discussed below, Williamson County sensibly reflected 
the reality of land use decision-making. It was San Remo that lowered the 
boom on takings plaintiffs, and not unintentionally. Indeed, the Court in 
San Remo knew exactly what it was doing. This was no mistake or 
oversight: The Court explained in San Remo,  
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the 
concern that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-
court proceedings that are not chosen, but are instead 
required in order to ripen federal takings claims. Whatever 
the merits of that concern may be, we are not free to 
disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve 
the availability of a federal forum.92  
In other words, little if anything about the “preclusion trap” argument 
speaks to why Williamson County was wrongly decided on its own 
terms.93 
 
 90. See id. at 2189–90; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision can only cause one to wonder which cases the Court 
will overrule next.”).  
 91. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 
(1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162. 
 92. San Remo Hotel, LP v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005). 
 93. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167, 2174, 2179. A further oddity of the Court’s approach in 
Knick is that, while purporting to overrule Williamson County and not San Remo, the Court never 
explained why San Remo’s preclusion rule did not mandate dismissal of Ms. Knick’s federal 
action. Ms. Knick, after all, had brought a taking claim in Pennsylvania state court before bringing 
her federal action. Id. at 2168. She could have sought, but did not seek, monetary compensation 
in that state court action. Id. Under the logic of San Remo, the Court should have invoked claim 
preclusion doctrine to dismiss her action. See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. The 
Court did not do so—without any suggestion that it was overruling or limiting San Remo. In any 
event, one can only hope that the Court’s opinion in Knick does not give future takings plaintiffs 
two bites at the apple—one in state court followed by a second in federal court. That result would 
clearly be inconsistent with the Court’s full faith and credit jurisprudence discussed below.  
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But for those upset about the “trap,” overruling Williamson County 
was far more attractive than limiting San Remo. This was so because San 
Remo’s interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Statute is far from an 
outlier. That is, revisiting San Remo would have altered the terrain for a 
whole host of civil rights plaintiffs. Overruling Williamson County to 
open the “trap”—backwards though that path may have been—ensured 
that it opens only for takings plaintiffs. 
In case after case long preceding San Remo, the Court has used the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute to bar plaintiffs from federal litigation of 
federal constitutional claims, and has expressed no concern about the 
same trap. Indeed, the Knick Court’s insistence that the Civil Rights Act 
“guarantees” a federal forum for state violations of constitutional rights 
simply does not accord with the Court’s prior encounters with these 
statutes.94 What appears like unfair treatment for takings plaintiffs is thus 
not nearly so unique.  
In Allen v. McCurry,95 for example, the Court held that a state court’s 
rejection of a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment case brought under the Civil 
Rights Act precluded him from relitigating that issue in federal court.96 
In that case, undercover police officers in St. Louis approached Willie 
McCurry’s front door and asked to buy some heroin while other officers 
hid nearby.97 McCurry responded by shooting at and wounding the 
undercover officers. Police returned fire, and McCurry surrendered.98 
The officers then entered his home without a warrant and found heroin in 
plain view and in drawers.99 At McCurry’s drug possession trial, he 
moved to suppress all of the heroin the officers found.100 A Missouri court 
granted his motion with respect to the heroin found in drawers but denied 
it with respect to the heroin found in plain view.101 After his conviction, 
McCurry sued the officers in federal district court under the Civil Rights 
Act, alleging that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment 
rights.102 The district court held, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the 
state court judgment issued in his criminal trial prevented him from 
 
 94. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. The original phrase the Court quotes is that the statute 
“provide[s]” such a federal forum. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994). Similarly 
misplaced, as the following discussion will illustrate, is the suggestion that access to federal courts 
is always available to provide a “minimum floor of constitutional rights.” Somin & Saxer, supra 
note 64, at 12. 
 95. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
 96. Id. at 103–05. 
 97. Id. at 92. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 91. 
 101. Id. at 92. 
 102. Id. 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/6
2020] A KNOCK ON KNICK’S REVIVAL OF FEDERAL TAKINGS LITIGATION 435 
 
 
litigating the issue in federal court.103 Interpreting the Full Faith and 
Credit Statute, the Court explained that, while the Civil Rights Act 
“create[d] a new federal cause of action,” it changed “nothing about the 
preclusive effect of state court judgments.”104 And in language that seems 
to have anticipated and rebutted the Knick majority’s reasoning thirty 
years in advance, the Court expressly rejected the notion “that every 
person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered 
opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of 
the legal posture in which the federal claim arises.”105 Indeed, there is “no 
reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a 
federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already 
decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding 
in which he would rather not have been engaged at all.”106 That is, even 
plaintiffs who did not voluntarily choose a state court forum in which to 
advance their constitutional rights are bound in federal court by the 
results of those state court proceedings. This is hardly a “guarantee” of a 
federal forum for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment by states.  
The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to alleged 
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments by states. In Migra v. 
Warren City School District,107 the Court considered whether a state court 
judgment might be preclusive, not only as to issues actually litigated in 
state court, but as to issues the plaintiff “could have raised but did not 
raise” in those state proceedings.108 In this case, a public school 
supervisor claimed in federal court to have been terminated by her school 
board in violation of the First Amendment as retaliation for protected 
speech. She also raised due process and equal protection claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.109 But in earlier state court proceedings about 
the same termination, she made only state law breach of contract and 
tortious interference arguments.110 She prevailed there, and the Supreme 
Court concluded that she was not entitled to another bite at the apple in 
federal court on her constitutional claims. The Civil Rights Act, the Court 
held, “does not override state preclusion law and guarantee petitioner a 
right to proceed to judgment in state court on her state claims and then 
turn to federal court for adjudication of her federal claims.”111 
 
 103. Id. at 92–93, 105. 
 104. Id. at 98. 
 105. Id. at 103. 
 106. Id. at 104 (emphasis added). 
 107. 465 U.S. 75 (1984). 
 108. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 79. 
 110. Id. at 78. 
 111. Id. at 85. 
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Finally, the Court held in Matsushita Electric v. Epstein112 that 
settlement of a class action in state court that purported to release even 
federal claims that could not have been brought in state court operated to 
preclude class members from litigating those claims in federal court.113 
There, a Delaware court approved the settlement of a state law class 
action which expressly released alleged violations of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission rules promulgated under the Exchange 
Act.114 Some class members pressed ahead with those securities claims 
in federal court on the theory that the Exchange Act confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on federal courts and that the Delaware judgment could 
therefore not preclude them from litigating that claim in federal court.115 
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the same Full Faith and Credit 
Statute at issue in San Remo, Allen, and Migra is “generally applicable in 
cases in which the state-court judgment at issue incorporates a class-
action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.”116 And just like it did in Allen and Migra with respect to 
the Civil Rights Act, the Court concluded that nothing in the Exchange 
Act expressly or impliedly altered the federal courts’ obligation under the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute to give preclusive effect to state court 
judgments—even those having to do with causes of action that could 
never have been brought in state court to begin with.117 
So criminal defendants who by necessity litigated their Fourth 
Amendment claims in their state court criminal trials cannot relitigate 
those claims in federal court. Civil rights plaintiffs who never litigated 
their First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in state court cannot raise 
them in federal court if they could have raised them in state court. And 
plaintiffs who not only did not but could not have litigated their federal 
law claims in state court cannot raise them in federal court if a state court 
settlement purports to release those claims. If takings plaintiffs faced a 
“preclusion trap,” then they were in very good company. In an earlier 
opinion urging the Court to overrule Williamson County, Justice Clarence 
Thomas claimed that this treatment of takings claims “has downgraded 
the protection afforded by the Takings Clause to second-class status,”118 
but if that were true, then the Takings Clause was in good company too. 
 
 112. 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 113. Id. at 375. 
 114. Id. at 387. 
 115. Id. at 380; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012). 
 116. Matsushita Elec., 516 U.S. at 375. 
 117. Id. at 380–81. The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to the preclusive 
effect of a state court judgment over antitrust claims under the exclusive jurisdiction of federal 
courts. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985).  
 118. Arrigoni Enters. v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
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This is not the place to explore whether all of these cases were rightly 
or wrongly decided. But they are nonetheless the law in these other 
arenas, and they call into serious question the Knick Court’s indignation 
that the federal courts were uniquely closed to takings plaintiffs, 
rendering the takings clause a second-class constitutional right. They also 
expose the Court’s inconsistent efforts at making that forum more easily 
accessible. Contrast the Court’s approach in these earlier cases—which 
privileges federalism, comity, respect for state courts, and finality over 
the interests of individual plaintiffs119—with its approach in Knick—
which does the opposite. The majority (and dissent, unfortunately) do not 
even mention Allen, Migra, or Matsushita, let alone attempt to reconcile 
the solicitude Knick offers to takings plaintiffs with the lack of such 
solicitude for other civil rights plaintiffs. This inconsistency is all the 
more ironic in light of the fact that there are especially good reasons to 
channel takings claims into state court—primarily that takings claims 
necessarily turn on a baseline of state property law, as we discuss in the 
next Part—and very few good reasons to do the same for other civil rights 
claims.120 Indeed, one might be forgiven for concluding that the Court 
likes precluding some plaintiffs from relitigating their state court losses 
in federal court—class action plaintiffs and First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment plaintiffs—just not takings plaintiffs. 
III.  PRACTICAL ISSUES 
The Court’s decision in Knick will present federal courts with a 
number of practical difficulties—some of which the Justices clearly 
understood, and others that garnered no discussion in either the majority 
opinion or the dissent. Justice Kagan’s dissent highlighted some, but not 
all, of the federalism concerns raised by federal litigation whose outcome 
largely turns on state property law.121 But neither the majority nor the 
dissent focused on two other issues certain to provoke future litigation: 
When is a taking “final” within the meaning of Williamson County’s first 
ripeness requirement, and does the Knick ruling open the doors of the 
federal courthouse to the myriad valuation claims that arise when state 
and local governments institute condemnation proceedings? 
A.  Peculiarities of State Substantive Law 
Resolution of takings claims will frequently rest on the substance of 
state property law, which often varies from state to state. State court 
 
 119. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec., 516 U.S. at 385–86; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465 
U.S. 75, 84 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104–05 (1980). 
 120. Sterk, supra note 8, at 286–92, 300 (“[T]he unusual Williamson County ripeness 
doctrine tracks the unusual nature of federal takings claims, which are heavily dependent on the 
content of background state law.”). 
 121. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187–89 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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judges, who confront these issues with greater frequency, are in a better 
position to understand the background of their respective state’s property 
law than are federal judges who rarely deal with property disputes.122 
Moreover, especially at the appellate level, the federal judges deciding 
takings cases may be from states other than the state in which the alleged 
taking occurred. 
Although Justice Kagan’s dissent recognized the federalism concerns 
raised by the Court’s decision,123 her opinion did not fully articulate the 
range of state law issues that are likely to arise in future takings litigation.  
1.  Regulatory Takings 
Justice Kagan cited two examples in which underlying state law might 
be critical to evaluating regulatory takings claims. The first is Knick 
itself.124 Whether the township’s requirement that Ms. Knick keep the 
graveyard on her property open to the public effects a taking depends, in 
considerable measure, on Pennsylvania’s background law governing 
cemeteries and burials. That law may differ materially from cemetery law 
in other states.125 
Justice Kagan’s second example involved divergent state approaches 
to beachfront land.126 In a number of states, the public trust doctrine 
provides a background limitation on development rights along the 
beachfront, so that legislative regulation of the beachfront does not 
significantly change background law.127 In other states that subscribe to 
a narrower conception of the public trust doctrine, similar regulation 
might raise a more persuasive taking claim.128 
The Court’s recent decision in Murr v. Wisconsin129 provides yet 
another illustration of the importance of state property law in evaluating 
regulatory takings claims. Murr concerned a Wisconsin regulation that 
 
 122. Id. at 2188. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 2187.  
 125. Professor Alfred Brophy’s exploration of cemetery law reveals a number of differences 
among the states. For instance, Indiana grants a right of access across cemetery land one day each 
year, while other states grant much broader access not merely across cemetery land, but across 
land necessary to arrive at cemetery land. Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights 
of the Graveyard, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1469, 1482–88. 
 126. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2188 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 127. See, e.g., Jack Potash, The Public Trust Doctrine and Beach Access: Comparing New 
Jersey to Nearby States, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 661, 672–73 (2016) (noting that New Jersey’s 
public trust doctrine requires public access to the dry sand area of privately owned land). 
 128. For instance, in Maryland and Delaware, private owners have the right to exclude 
members of the public from the dry sand area of beaches. Id. at 673–77. In these states, a 
regulation limiting a right to exclude might present a more plausible taking claim than the same 
regulation in New Jersey. 
 129. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
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increased the minimum lot size for development along a waterway.130  
The owner of what had previously been two separate lots challenged the 
regulation because it made development on one of the lots unlawful, 
leading the landowner to contend that the regulation had deprived that lot 
of all economic value and was therefore a per se taking under the doctrine 
articulated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.131 The 
underlying question was whether the two parcels together constituted the 
“denominator” against which the taking claim should be measured, or 
whether each parcel individually was its own “denominator.”132 Both the 
majority and the dissent concluded that state law was relevant to that 
inquiry,133 but Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the case 
should be remanded to the state court because the state law on the issue 
should be dispositive.134 
These examples are far from exhaustive. The point is that in a host of 
regulatory taking cases, Knick will now require federal courts to make 
decisions about the content of underlying state property law in the first 
instance, often with limited guidance from state courts. If, as the Chief 
Justice indicated in Murr, defining property rights is ultimately a state 
law function, concerns about intervention by federal courts insufficiently 
attuned to the nuances surrounding those rights should have militated 
against the Court’s result in Knick.  
2.  Other Implicit Takings 
Regulatory takings of the sort at issue in Knick comprise a subset—
albeit an important one—of a broader set of actions that landowners often 
challenge as takings. An implicit taking claim can also arise when, acting 
in an enterprise capacity, government causes harm that would, if 
committed by a private owner, be compensable under state nuisance or 
trespass law.135 For instance, a local government might operate a waste 
 
 130. Id. at 1939–40. 
 131. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941, 1943.  
 132. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–49. 
 133. Id. at 1945 (noting that courts should give substantial weight to treatment under state 
law); id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that state law should determine the private 
property at issue). 
 134. Id. at 1956 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 135. In an influential article, Professor Joseph Sax first identified “enterprise capacity” 
taking claims as a distinct category. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE 
L.J. 36, 62 (1964). Sax argued that when government caused harm while acting in its enterprise 
capacity, the adversely affected landowner was entitled to compensation. Id. at 64. Sax later 
repudiated that mechanical rule. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 
81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 n.5 (1971). Sax’s insight that enterprise capacity claims are different from 
claims of excessive regulation remains significant, and enterprise capacity claims are statistically 
more likely to be successful than claims of excessive regulation. See James E. Krier & Stewart E. 
Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 59 tbl.2 (2016). 
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disposal facility that devalues neighboring land or an airport that causes 
disruptive noise.136 Alternatively, government might act as a public 
utility, and its provision of water might cause private wells to run dry,137 
or its operation of a sewer system might cause harmful backups.138 
Although in each of these cases, the harms suffered are similar to those 
generally covered by tort law, governmental immunity doctrines 
applicable in many states have precluded tort actions against the state or 
other governmental entities.139 State constitutions, however, have taking 
clauses that trump legislatively-created immunity doctrines.140 As a 
result, landowners have often styled their claims as claims under the 
takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions rather than as tort 
claims.141 In light of Knick, these claims are apparently cognizable in 
federal court too. 
The importance of state law extends beyond immunity doctrine. 
Underlying state substantive property law may affect whether 
government’s harm-causing activity is actionable at all. For instance, in 
some states, landowners may have no right to prevent others from drilling 
wells that interfere with subsurface water levels, while other states 
 
 136. See, e.g., Wilson v. Key Tronic Corp., 701 P.2d 518, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
 137. See, e.g., Jones v. E. Lansing-Meridian Water & Sewer Auth., 296 N.W.2d 202, 203 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (per curiam).   
 138. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilbert v. City of Cincinnati, 928 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ohio 2010) 
(per curiam).  
 139. See Maureen E. Brady, The Damagings Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV. 341, 362 (2018) 
(noting that state statutes enacted in the early twentieth century granted government immunity 
from tort suits, restricting the ability of landowners to bring nuisance suits against the 
government). Professor Robert Brauneis has noted, however, that in the nineteenth century, state 
courts had developed exceptions to immunity doctrine that held government entities and 
government officials liable for trespass and other injuries to real property. Robert Brauneis, The 
First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just 
Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 75–82 (1999). Even when sovereign immunity waivers 
permit suits against the state, though, the remedies available to the landowner may be limited by 
damage caps. Brady, supra, at 397. 
 140. See Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 819, 853–54 (2006) (noting that state constitutional taking clauses were treated as waivers 
of sovereign immunity). 
 141. In a number of modern cases, courts have dismissed tort claims but permitted taking 
claims to prevail. In many of these cases, plaintiffs relied on the takings clause in the state 
constitution. See, e.g., Brewer v. State, 341 P.3d 1107, 1118, 1120–21 (Alaska 2014) (holding the 
state immune in tort for damages caused by fire set to deprive an advancing wildfire of fuel); 
Peterman v. Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 521 N.W.2d 499, 511–12, 514 (Mich. 1994) (holding that 
destruction of fast lands does not fall within trespass–nuisance exception to sovereign immunity 
but does give rise to taking claim); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630–35 (Utah 
1990) (holding that a sovereign immunity statute does not apply to taking claims). In other cases, 
plaintiffs have also relied on the federal constitution’s takings clause. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants 
at 25–27, Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010) (No. 20081061), 2009 WL 
6811344, at *25–28. 
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recognize such a right.142 Those differences may dictate different 
approaches to taking claims when government entities drill wells that 
cause a drop in the water table, resulting in difficulties for neighboring 
landowners who rely on their own wells for water. By the same token, 
the strength of a taking claim arising from the government’s operation of 
a landfill may depend in part on the state’s common law of nuisance. If a 
private actor would not be liable for analogous activities, there is less 
basis for holding that the government has taken the neighbor’s property. 
Knick also threatens to enmesh federal courts in construction of state 
constitutional provisions, which play a significant role in taking claims 
arising out of nonregulatory government actions. Many states provide 
broader property protection than the federal constitution, requiring 
compensation not just for taking of property, but also for “damaging” of 
property.143 In states whose constitutions include these “damaging” 
clauses, claimants typically allege that the government action constituted 
both a (federal and state) taking and a (state) damaging.144 Until Knick, 
these actions would be heard in state court, and any state constitutional 
claims would ultimately be resolved by the state supreme court.145   Knick, 
however, suggests that a plaintiff who alleges a taking may proceed to 
federal court on the federal taking claim, putting the federal court in the 
position of resolving the pendent state constitutional claims as well. The 
Knick opinion appears to foreclose federal abstention, pending resolution 
of these state constitutional claims.146 As a result, federal courts will have 
to either certify these state constitutional questions to state courts 
(increasing the delay and cost of litigation)147 or decide these important 
questions of state constitutional law themselves. 
B.  The Williamson County “Final Decision” Requirement 
The second practical issue raised by Knick arises from the fact that 
Williamson County imposed two ripeness requirements, not one. 
 
 142. Compare Bingham, 235 P.3d at 739 (no taking), with Jones, 296 N.W.2d at 205 (taking). 
 143. See generally Brady, supra note 139, at 344, 355–60 (discussing how the Constitution 
does not include the word “damage” but many states have takings clauses that include the words 
“damage” or “damaging”).  
 144. See id. at 393–94, 398. 
 145. See id. at 378–82 (discussing different state courts struggling to interpret damages 
clauses).   
 146. If the Court in Knick had contemplated federal abstention pending resolution of state 
law claims, it would not be true that a property owner who has suffered a taking may, without 
regard to subsequent state court proceedings, “sue the government at that time in federal court for 
the ‘deprivation’ of a right ‘secured by the Constitution.’” Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 
2162, 2170 (2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).  
 147. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions 
of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1697 (2003) (noting that temporal and monetary costs of 
certification are not insignificant). 
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Williamson County’s now-abandoned requirement that federal taking 
plaintiffs first use state compensation procedures had initially shielded 
federal courts from litigation about the first requirement: a taking claim 
does not become ripe until the relevant state or municipal body has made 
the final decision that works a taking of property.148 The landowner in 
Knick did not challenge the first requirement, which in the Court’s words 
was “not at issue here.”149 
But Knick’s abolition of the state compensation requirement will 
generate more pressure on the final decision requirement. Federal courts 
will now have to determine when a local decision becomes final. 
Moreover, the Court has not made it clear whether that inquiry should be 
governed by local law or by federal constitutional law. Take Williamson 
County for example. In that case, the landowner faced the common 
situation in which a proposed development required the approval of 
multiple bodies.150 The county’s legislative body was responsible for first 
amending a zoning ordinance to reduce the permissible density in the 
district.151 The Zoning Board of Appeals then had authority to interpret 
the ordinance and to grant variances from its terms.152 County ordinances 
further required a third body—the County Planning Commission—to 
approve all subdivisions of land.153 The landowner faced the following 
dilemma: After the legislative body reduced the permissible density on 
the subject parcel by amending the ordinance, the Planning Commission 
denied the landowner’s subdivision, in part relying on the excess 
density.154 The Zoning Board of Appeals concluded that the older 
ordinance was applicable, obviating the need for any variance,155 but the 
Planning Commission concluded that the Zoning Board of Appeals had 
no authority to review its determination that the amended ordinance 
governed (a state law issue).156 The landowner then brought a taking 
claim in federal district court.157 
In holding that the landowner’s claim was not ripe because the 
landowner had not received a final decision on its development proposal, 
the Supreme Court focused on the landowner’s failure to seek variances 
 
 148. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 175–76, 
overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162. For general discussion of the various bodies involved in the 
land use approval process, see PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 4:5 to :7 (5th 
ed. 2008). 
 151. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 178. 
 152. Id. at 180 n.3. 
 153. Id. at 176. 
 154. Id. at 178–79. 
 155. Id. at 180–81. 
 156. Id. at 181–82. 
 157. Id. at 182. 
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the Zoning Board of Appeals could have granted from the terms of the 
zoning ordinance and variances the Planning Commission could have 
granted from the county’s subdivision regulations.158 On the merits—
which the Court did not reach—the landowner’s taking claim faced 
significant problems. The landowner had already obtained final approval 
for 212 units on a portion of the development,159 and even its expert 
conceded at trial that it could accommodate all of the Planning 
Commission’s objections and still build an additional 67 units.160 But the 
issue that federal courts now will face is not the issue on the merits, but 
how to determine when the alleged taking became final—an issue that so 
far has plagued even the state courts that are more likely to be familiar 
with local zoning processes. 
First, in the common case of multi-board review, must the landowner 
seek relief from each involved board before courts will deem the claim 
ripe? The Williamson County court noted the need to seek variances from 
both the Planning Commission and the Zoning Board of Appeals—even 
though the latter had interpreted the ordinance in a way that would have 
made variances unnecessary.161 Moreover, suppose both the Zoning 
Board of Appeals and the Planning Commission had denied variances. 
The landowner still could have applied to the local legislative body—the 
body that tightened the zoning requirements—for an amendment of the 
ordinance. Because the difference between local legislative bodies and 
local administrative bodies has no particular federal constitutional 
significance, it is difficult to see why the finality requirement would not 
also encompass the need to seek a zoning amendment.162 
Second, does the nature of the variance matter? It would be easy for a 
landowner to seek a variance that would clearly be denied if that would 
be enough to ripen a taking claim. But denial of that variance would not 
establish the local board’s resistance to a more modest variance request. 
The local board is typically a reactive body; it does not generate 
development plans on its own. The typical approval process involves a 
give-and-take between developer and board in which the developer 
 
 158. Id. at 188. 
 159. Id. at 178. 
 160. Id. at 182. 
 161. Id. at 181. The Zoning Board of Appeals had determined that the Commission should 
apply the prior ordinance and subdivision regulations, and it also determined that the Planning 
Commission should resolve other disputed issues in a manner favorable to the developer. Id. Had 
the Planning Commission accepted the Zoning Board’s determination, the need for further 
variances would have been obviated. 
 162. See, e.g., Southdown, Inc. v. Jackson Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 809 A.2d 1059, 1068 
(Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2002) (holding that “[w]hen a use [of property] is proscribed . . . the party seeking 
the non-conforming use must request, inter alia, a variance or zoning change”).  
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proposes and the board reacts.163 If the goal of ripeness is to sharpen a 
court’s understanding of what a board would ultimately approve, the 
ripeness requirement might require a developer to make multiple 
applications to ripen its claim. 
Third, should courts engraft a futility exception onto the requirement 
that a landowner obtain variances? Landowners sometimes assert that 
applications would be fruitless because the local board has made it clear 
that any applications would be denied.164 If courts were to develop a 
futility exception to the ripeness requirement, the next hurdle would be 
determining what evidence suffices to trigger the exception. 
Knick also raises difficult finality questions with respect to taking 
claims that do not involve regulation. Consider, for instance, a landowner 
who has suffered flooding as the result of a road construction project. 
Suppose, under state law, the flooding would constitute a nuisance. 
Suppose further that the landowner would have a claim for injunctive 
relief, money damages, or both. Does she have a ripe taking claim? If, as 
the court suggests in Knick, the taking is separate from the remedy, the 
landowner could argue that the taking claim is ripe as soon as the flooding 
starts—even if state law doctrine makes it clear that the landowner has 
other remedies outside of taking law for the harm she has suffered.  
These are only a few of the ripeness issues federal courts will now 
face in light of Knick.165 One might take the Court’s statement that the 
finality requirement is not at issue as a signal that the Court will revisit 
that requirement as well. But it is difficult to imagine how takings 
litigation can proceed without crystallization of the government’s 
position, a function that Williamson County’s first ripeness requirement 
currently serves. Knick means federal courts will inevitably be drawn into 
these thickets now. 
C.  The Impact of Knick on Condemnation Proceedings 
Although implicit taking cases attract the lion’s share of attention in 
academia and at the Supreme Court, explicit taking cases are the bread 
and butter of many property lawyers. Sometimes, as in Kelo v. City of 
 
 163. See Stewart E. Sterk & Kimberly J. Brunelle, Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res 
Judicata Doctrine in Land Use Cases, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1165 (2011) (noting the give-and-
take process that educates landowners about objections and enables landowners to present a new 
application that better accommodates neighborhood concerns).  
 164. See, e.g., Hendee v. Putnam Twp., 786 N.W.2d 521, 532 (Mich. 2010) (rejecting an 
argument that futility exception ripened landowner’s taking claim against allegedly exclusionary 
zoning ordinance). 
 165. Suppose, for instance, a landowner who wants to demolish a historic building seeks to 
challenge a historic district designation as a taking. Must the landowner first obtain a final denial 
of an application for a demolition permit? See Casey v. Mayor of Rockville, 929 A.2d 74, 107–
09 (Md. 2007) (answering in the affirmative).  
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New London,166 the issue is whether the government’s taking is for public 
use.167 In the more common case, the dispute is over the valuation of the 
property taken. 
These explicit taking cases have largely been fodder for state courts. 
In light of Williamson County and San Remo, a landowner unhappy with 
a state’s resolution of an explicit taking claim was effectively limited to 
state court. Knick, however, appears to open federal court doors to some 
or all of these explicit taking claims, potentially raising a host of issues 
the Court did not anticipate. 
The Court in Knick expressly separated the “taking” inquiry from the 
“just compensation” inquiry, and on top of the problems we have already 
discussed, it is no easy matter to determine when an explicit taking 
occurs. Perhaps the taking occurs when title vests in the condemnor. 
Alternatively, the taking might occur when the condemnor becomes 
entitled to possession. State law varies materially. For instance, in 
Massachusetts, a government condemnor acquires title and the right to 
possession without the need for any judicial proceeding.168  Once the 
condemnor adopts and records an order of taking, title transfers to the 
condemnor and the condemnee obtains a right to damages for the 
taking.169 By contrast, in Ohio, the condemnor does not acquire title or 
the right to possession until after judicial condemnation proceedings are 
complete.170 And in Nebraska, title does not vest in the condemnor until 
the condemnor actually puts the property to use.171 Knick’s conceptual 
separation of the “taking” from the “just compensation” might suggest 
that in Massachusetts, an aggrieved landowner could seek just 
compensation in federal court as soon as the condemning agency orders 
the taking, while in Ohio and Nebraska, no federal claim would ever 
become available, because the claim would not become ripe until the state 
court had determined just compensation—a determination that would 
then preclude relitigation of the compensation issue in federal court under 
San Remo. Like the ones we explored in Section II.B, this disparity in 
result—again based solely on differences in state procedure—appears 
difficult to justify as a matter of federal constitutional law. 
Moreover, even in states that generally hold that title does not vest 
until the close of condemnation proceedings, statutes sometimes provide 
for quick take proceedings which give the condemnor a right to 
 
 166. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 167. Id. at 472. 
 168. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 79, § 3 (2019). 
 169. Id.  
 170. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.15 (LexisNexis 2019). 
 171. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-714 (2019). 
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possession upon payment into court of an estimated value.172 In Ohio, the 
payment by the condemnor into court, and the condemnee’s withdrawal 
of the funds “shall in no way interfere with the action [for just 
compensation] except that the sum so withdrawn shall be deducted from 
the sum of the final verdict or award.”173 Would use of the quick take 
procedure ripen a federal claim, in the midst of the state condemnation 
proceeding? Nothing in the Knick opinion answers the question. 
Robert Thomas has suggested that Knick might not apply to explicit 
exercises of the eminent domain power because, in those sorts of cases, 
the government admits it owes compensation.174 But, of course, valuation 
disputes arise because the government does not admit that it owes the 
compensation the landowner believes the Constitution requires. The 
difference between the parties’ respective assessments of what the 
Constitution requires can be vast.175 Moreover, in some eminent domain 
cases, the issue is whether a particular interest constitutes constitutionally 
compensable property—the very same issue that arises in implicit taking 
cases.176 
If a federal taking claim does become ripe before a state determines 
just compensation, the federal court hearing the claim faces another set 
of questions: May it (or must it) bypass state procedures for determining 
compensation? In many states, the initial compensation decision is made 
by commissioners, often with expertise in valuation matters.177 In others, 
the compensation determination is made by courts without the benefit of 
a jury.178 Some states provide that the condemnee is entitled to attorney’s 
fees. In some states, courts have discretion to award fees where the order 
is in excess of the condemnor’s offer.179 In other states, fees are awarded 
only if, at trial, the judgment exceeds the condemnor’s initial offer by a 
specified amount.180 For example, in Florida, the fees are based on how 
 
 172. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.06. See generally 7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § G2.04 (2019) (summarizing differences between normal and quick takings). 
 173. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.06(c). 
 174. Thomas, supra note 70, at 24. 
 175. For instance, in Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013), the 
government offered $300 in compensation to a landowner for losses resulting from a dune 
construction project, while the landowner claimed entitlement to $500,000 for loss of an ocean 
view.  The government argued—and the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed—that because the 
project increased the value of landowner’s parcel as a whole, the landowner was not entitled to 
separate compensation for loss of the view. 
 176. See, e.g., id. 
 177. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-504 (2018). 
 178. See, e.g., N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 501(B) (McKinney 2019). 
 179. See, e.g., id. § 701. 
 180. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 32.28(3) (2018) (awarding litigation expenses when award 
exceeds condemnor’s highest offer by at least 15%). 
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much benefit the lawyer achieved for the condemnee.181 If these claims 
are brought in federal court, are federal courts required to apply some or 
all of these state rules?182 Resolution of the issue might depend on the 
purpose of the state law rules and, in any event, would require further 
litigation. 
Federal courts would also have to face substantive explicit taking 
issues from which they have so far been spared. Two examples are 
illustrative. First, suppose a governmental entity condemns land already 
subject to regulation. Certainly the landowner’s compensation should not 
be measured by the value of the land if it were unregulated. But in 
computing just compensation, should a court consider the likelihood that, 
absent condemnation, the landowner might be able to obtain modification 
of the regulations? Some state courts have concluded that compensation 
should consider the possibility of modification,183 but the likelihood of 
modification will depend heavily on background state law. Federal courts 
are at a comparative disadvantage in assessing that likelihood. 
Second, when a government entity condemns only part of a 
landowner’s land, the condemnation might affect the value of the 
remainder of the landowner’s land—either positively or negatively.184 
 
 181. The Florida statute defines benefits as the difference “between the final judgment or 
settlement and the last written offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant hires 
an attorney.” FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1)(a) (2019). The statutory fees are 33% of any benefit up to 
$250,000, plus 25% of any portion of the benefit between $250,000 and $1,000,000, plus 20% of 
any portion of the benefit exceeding $1,000,000. Id. § 73.092(1)(c).  
 182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, 
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Spriggs v. State, 54 A.D.2d 1080, 1081 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that 
valuation should consider likelihood that condemnee’s property would be rezoned to permit more 
intensive use). New York courts have also indicated that valuation should take into account the 
possibility that the existing zoning would be invalidated as a taking. See In re New Creek Bluebelt, 
Phase 3, 156 A.D.3d 163, 166–67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (holding that when condemnor takes 
property already regulated as wetlands, condemnee is entitled to incremental increase to reflect 
the reasonable probability that the wetlands regulations themselves would have been found to 
constitute a regulatory taking). 
 184. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013), illustrates both the 
positive and negative effects of condemnation. The borough condemned beachfront land to 
construct a dune that would connect to other dunes and protect homes and businesses of the area 
against ocean storms. Id. at 526. The condemnation had two effects on the remainder of 
condemnees’ land: it protected the remainder of their property from storms, and it interfered with 
the view of the ocean from their home. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the 
condemnation award should be determined by subtracting fair market value after the taking from 
fair market value before the taking. Id. at 527. The court acknowledged that other states had held 
that only “special” benefits, not “general” benefits could be considered to reduce the amount of 
compensation available in cases of partial taking, but it indicated that determining what constitutes 
a “special” benefit varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Id. at 539, 540. 
29
Sterk and Pollack: A Knock on Knick's Revival of Federal Takings Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
448 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
States differ on how just compensation should account for those changes 
in the value of landowner’s remaining land,185 presenting another set of 
substantive issues federal courts will be called upon to resolve if they now 
have jurisdiction over just compensation for explicit takings. 
Finally, aside from valuation issues, Knick may open the federal 
courts to “public use” challenges of the sort the Supreme Court faced in 
Kelo v. City of New London. Although Kelo leaves little room for federal 
constitutional challenges based on the absence of public use,186 the 
Court’s opinion,187 and particularly Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,188 
keeps the door open—at least a crack—for public use challenges. 
Permitting such challenges to proceed in federal court in the first instance 
would be problematic, especially since many states impose public use 
limitations that restrict governments more than those articulated by the 
Supreme Court do.189  
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Knick removes the barrier to federal court that 
the Court had previously erected in its Williamson County and San Remo 
 
 185. See Brittany Harrison, Note, The Compensation Conundrum in Partial Takings Cases 
and the Consequences of Borough of Harvey Cedars, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE-NOVO 31, 42–
51, http://cardozolawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/HARRISON.36.denovo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9HPZ-A2HT] (surveying different state approaches). 
 186. The Court indicated that public purpose was to be defined broadly, “reflecting our 
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.” Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). 
 187. The Court’s opinion concedes that “the sovereign may not take the property of A for the 
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.” 
Id. at 477. 
 188. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not 
warranted for economic development takings in general, or for the particular 
takings at issue in this case, does not foreclose the possibility that a more 
stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff might 
be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings. There may be 
private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of 
private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of 
invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause. 
Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 189. See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82, 84, 85 
(2015) (noting that forty-four states had changed their laws in response to Kelo, and that thirty of 
them had tightened definitions of public use or public purpose); see also Ilya Somin, The Limits 
of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2103–05 (2009) 
(noting widespread response to Kelo, but concluding that much of it has been ineffective); cf. In 
re Condemnation by the Re-development Auth. of Lawrence Cty., 962 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Pa. 
Cmmw. Ct. 2008) (concluding that state law imposed stricter public use requirements than Kelo 
did).  
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decisions. Knick, however, rests on deeply questionable assumptions 
about the structure and operation of state and local government and on 
the incorrect premise that all constitutional claimants—other than taking 
claimants—have been guaranteed a federal forum. Moreover, the 
decision’s focus on regulatory takings ignores Knick’s potential 
implications for other takings—both implicit and explicit. Federal courts 
may now be drawn into resolving a host of difficult state law issues 
outside their areas of expertise. Not even Justice Kagan’s dissent focused 
on the decision’s potential scope, which will inevitably become fodder 
for further litigation until the Court fashions a strategy to retreat from its 
ill-founded and its ill-advised pronouncements. 
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